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Maryland
Embraces
Emotional
Distress
by Andrea Gentile

Although plaintiff Harris did not prevail
in his case, Jones v. Harris, 35 Md.App.
556, 371 A.2d 1104 (1977) saw the first
direct judicial recognition of intentional
infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort in Maryland.
Harris brought an action for damages
against Jones and against General Motors
Corporation alleging that Jones, while in
the course of his duty as a G.M.C. supervisor, intentionally mimicked his (Harris')
speech impediment, attempted to humiliate him with snide remarks, and continued to do so for an extended period of
time with resulting emotional distress to
Harris.
The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress has been recognized for
a number of years in California, Virginia
and other jurisdictions. However, as this
was a case of first impression in Maryland,
the court first traced "The Interest In
Freedom From Emotional Distress" from
the 1934 Restatement of Torts which
refused to recognize it as an independent
tort, to PROSSER'S LAW OF TORTS (4th Edition) where the distinguished dean gave
recognition to the tort and described its
boundaries. General recognition of the
tort was found, said the court, in 64
A.L.R. 2d 100 (dealing with emotional
distress) where it is stated that the earlier
case opinions which disallowed recovery
for emotional distress alone should be
treated as dicta. The trend is toward
allowing recovery when there is severe
emotional distress caused by an intentionally or recklessly committed,
unprivileged act of the defendant, which
was reasonably calculated to cause severe
emotional distress to the plaintiff.
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In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 A. 22 (1931),
the court allowed damages for emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff and
caused by the defendant's agent's delivery
of a package containing a dead rat in lieu
of the requested loaf of bread. The c()Urt
based its decision on a negligence theory,
concluding that the agent of the defendant
had carelessly and negligently performed
his duty by allowing the rat to be
substituted for the bread. However, the
Jones court said that in the Roch case the
string was " ... quite lightly tied ... " to
the tort of negligence, and they infer that
the Roch and Mahnke v Moore, 197 Md.
61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951) (damages
allowed where the father of a young child
forced her to watch him murder her
mother and then kill himself) were, in
effect, cases of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court concluded
that the new tort would be viable in Maryland in a proper case. 35 Md.App. at 561,
371 A.2d at 1107.
The case of Womack v. Eldridge, 215
Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 140 (1974) provided the guidelines used by the Jones
court to determine when a cause of action
would lie for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury. The elements
outlined by the court are:
1. The wrongdoer's conduct is intentional or reckless. Womack held
that, "this element is satisfied where
the wrongdoer had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress
or where he intended his specific
conduct and knew or should have
known that emotional distress
would likely result." 35 Md. App. at
569-570, 1371 A.2d at 1108.
2. The conduct is outrageous to the
extent that it offends the generally
accepted standards of decency and
morality.
3. There is a causal connection between the wrongdoer's actions and
the emotional distress.
4. The emotional distress must be
severe.

Harris provided testimony from a coworker as to Jones' conduct toward Harris, and it was probably based on that
testimony that the court found that the
first two elements were clearly met in the
instant case. However, there was no evidence presented to show a causal connection between Jones' alleged harrassment

and Harris' emotional distress. Testimony
by Harris' wife pointed out that Harris'
problems started at least seven months
prior to the time Jones began his harrassment. Emotional distrurbance could be inferred by Mrs. Harris' testimony that in
November, 1974 he was drinking heavily
and threw a meat platter at her. Finally
Harris' own testimony tended to refute his
allegation of causal connection between
his emotional disturbance and Jones' harrassment. He stated that he began seeking
medical attention for his problems six
years prior to this case.
With no evidence to support the third
and fourth elements of the tort, Harris
could not prevail. But the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is
now alive in Maryland. Be kind to neighbors and co-workers.

Solicitation
Broadened
by John Jeffrey Ross

Of no small consequence in local criminal jurisprudence is D.C. Code §22-2701,
popularly known as the "solicitation
statute" :
It shall not be lawful for any person to
invite, entice, persuade, or to address
for the purpose of inviting, enticing,
persuading, any person or persons sixteen years of age or over in the District
of Columbia, for the purpose of prostitution, or any other immoral or lewd
purpose ...
Nearly six percent of the arrests in the
District of Columbia in 1975 were for
commercial sex crimes and over 1100 of
these were prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney. See J.D. Welsh and D. Viets, The
Pretrial Offender in the District of Columbia (District of Columbia Bail Agency/Office of Criminal Justice Plans and
Analysis, Washington, D.C. 1977).
The Metropolitan Police Department of
the District is entitled to exercise considerable police power through this
statute, which provides congressional assent to law enforcement activities

